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Scope insensitivity in helping decisions: Is it a matter of culture and values? 
 
Abstract 
The singularity effect of identifiable victims refers to people’s greater 
willingness to help a single concrete victim, as compared with a group of victims 
experiencing the same need. We present three studies exploring values and cultural 
sources of this effect. In the first study, the singularity effect was found only among 
western Israelis and not among Bedouin participants (a more collectivist group). In 
study 2 individuals with higher collectivist values were more likely to contribute to a 
group of victims. Finally, the third study demonstrates a more causal relationship 
between collectivist values and the singularity effect by showing that enhancing 
people's collectivist values using a priming manipulation produces similar donations 
to single victims and groups. Moreover, participants' collectivist preferences mediated 
the interaction between the priming conditions and singularity of the recipient. 
Implications for several areas of psychology and ways to enhance caring for groups in 
need are discussed.  
 
 
Key words: Singularity effect; identifiable victims; helping behavior; cultural 
differences; individualism; collectivism 
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Introduction 
In today's world where communication is open and available almost 
anywhere, we regularly encounter information about human life in danger and people 
in need, including extensive humanitarian crises as well as touching stories describing 
specific individuals in need. How do we react to such tragic events? Which events are 
more likely to catch our attention and recruit our willingness to provide aid?  
One might expect that extensive humanitarian crises involving a large number 
of people at risk would attract more attention and motivate greater willingness to help 
than a smaller number of people in risk, a family or one specific person in need. 
However, research in the last decade consistently shows that people are insensitive to 
the magnitude of quantitative outcomes in their willingness to support public causes 
and in moral decisions (e.g., Baron, 1997; Desvousges et al. 1993; Frederick & 
Fischhoff, 1998; Kahneman & Ritov, 1994). Particularly, Hsee & Rottenstreich's 
(2004) research supports the idea that subjective values are highly sensitive to the 
presence or absence of a stimulus (i.e., a change from 0 to some number) but are 
largely insensitive to further variations in scope, especially when affect-rich stimuli 
are considered.   
Research on the identifiable victim effect indicates that this scope insensitivity 
is typical of people’s evaluation of human lives, especially when the targets of help 
are identified (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b; Slovic, 2007). According to research in 
the last decade, identified victims (victims about whom we have some information) 
evoke greater emotions and recruit greater willingness to help than unidentified 
victims (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997; Small & Loewenstein, 2003: Small, 
Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2006). Moreover, a single identifiable victim evokes greater 
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willingness to help than a group of people experiencing the same need (whether 
identified or not). In Kogut and Ritov’s (2005a, b) research, for example, a single 
identified victim produced greater willingness to contribute and stronger affective 
reactions than an unidentified single victim, or a group of victims regardless of their 
being identified or not, demonstrating the “singularity effect”—the preference for 
helping a single identified victim, over a group of victims. Recently, Västfjäll, Slovic, 
Mayorga, & Peters (2014) showed that the effect of identification diminishes even 
with two victims. 
Following the above results, Slovic (2007) describes a “collapse model” of 
people’s response to numerous victims, suggesting that even with the transition from 
one to two victims, feelings and meaning begin to fade. As the group becomes larger 
and represented by numbers rather than images, these large numbers of victims 
represent dry statistics that fail to spark emotion and feelings and thus fail to motivate 
actions. 
The tendency to respond with greater caring to a specific individual may be 
explained by the different cognitive processes that are involved in people's 
perceptions of single targets and groups (e.g. Hamilton & Sherman, 1996 ; Susskind 
et al. 1999). According to that line of research, a single individual, unlike a group, is 
viewed as a psychologically coherent unit. This leads to more extensive processing of 
information about individuals than about groups. Thus, people more readily make 
extreme attributions about individuals than about groups, they respond more quickly 
and with greater confidence when asked to make a judgment about an individual as 
compared with a group. These cognitive processes may increase caring and helping 
for single recipients (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a; Slovic, 2007). However, these cognitive 
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mechanisms as well as the singularity effect in helping decisions were found mostly in 
western societies.  It might be that the spontaneous emotional arousal evoked by the 
single identifiable victim and the preference to help such a victim more than a group 
of victims experiencing the same need is dependent on culture. Specifically, western 
societies’ individualism (according to which the individual person is the purpose for 
which society exists; Triandis, 1995) may attract people’s attention and enhance their 
caring for the one victim and less so when the target is a group. If that is the case, we 
would expect people in eastern societies with collectivist values or individuals in any 
culture with greater collectivist values (emphasizing the primacy of the group or 
community rather than each individual person; Triandis, 1995) to show no such 
preference and to provide similar amounts of help to groups of needy others. 
Research examining the broad conceptualizations of individualism and 
collectivism has shown a host of differences between the two concepts in focus of 
attention, self-definitions, motivations, emotional connections to in-groups, as well as 
belief systems and behavioral patterns (Ho & Chiu, 1994; Oyserman et al., 2002; 
Triandis, 1995; Shavitt, Torelli, & Riemer, 2011; Triandis, Leung, Villareal, & Clack, 
1985). Specifically in the context of helping behavior, research suggests that among 
other reasons, cultural values or norms may cause differences in willingness to help 
across different cultures (Levine, Norenzayan, & Philbrick, 2001). The important 
distinction between individualistic and collectivist cultures may explain the different 
psychological mechanisms that underline the decision to help.  
Although helping behaviors are common and valued in both cultures, the 
motivation for such behaviors might be different (Barrett et al., 2004). Willingness to 
help in individualistic societies is likely to be compatible with individualistic values 
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of self-determination, self-promotion, or self-actualization. For example, 
Kemmelmeier, Jambor, and Letner, (2006) have found higher levels of charitable 
giving and volunteering in individualistic states (as compared with more collectivist 
states) in the United States, especially when the causes were compatible with 
individualistic causes. Helping principals, according to which helpers’ choose to 
whom to offer help, are expected to be more common in individualistic societies. 
Thus we expect people in individualistic societies to be more influenced by specific 
information about a person in need, whereas such factors may play a smaller role for 
people in collectivist societies. Moreover, the focus on the individual as the core of 
the society might increase willingness to help an individual person. On the other hand, 
collectivist societies are expected to show no such preference due to their emphasis of 
the group or community (Triandis, 1995).  
From a cultural psychological perspective, individualism and collectivism are 
important constructs that capture fundamental differences in how people perceive the 
relationship between individuals and societies and whether individuals or groups are 
seen as the basic unit of analyses (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). 
Specifically, numerous researchers suggest the distinction between 4 components of 
cultural orientations (e.g. Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis & 
Gelfand, 1998). According to this line of research, besides the distinction between 
individualism and collectivism, the distinction between horizontal and vertical 
culture-orientations plays a crucial role in determining culture differences. Horizontal 
orientation emphasizes equality as opposed to vertical orientation which emphasizes 
hierarchy. Both individualism and collectivism may be horizontal or vertical; thus 4 
different cultural orientations may be diagnosed:  
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Horizontal Individualism (HI) - assesses the extent to which individuals strive to be 
distinct without desiring special status. Horizontal Collectivism- assesses the extent to 
which individuals emphasize interdependence but "do not submit easily to authority." 
Vertical Individualism (VI) assesses the extent to which individuals strive to be 
distinct and desire special status. Finally, Vertical Collectivism (VC) assesses the 
extent to which individuals emphasize interdependence and competition with out-
groups.  
In our view, the preference to help the one identifiable victim over a group of 
several victims experiencing the same need is related to individualism's focus on 
personal goals over communal goals; i.e. the strive to be distinct (HI) and is less 
related to a desire for special status. Likewise, collectivists' emphasis on 
interdependence and relatedness to the in-group (rather than the competition with out-
groups) is expected to mediate this preference; meaning that societies with higher HC 
values are expected to show no preference to the single individual victim and are 
expected to assign at least the same amount of resources to help a group of victims. 
Besides differences between cultures, within-cultural variations in the extent 
to which individuals see themselves in terms of their relationships to others and to 
social groups, may be an important predictor of people's pro-social decisions (e.g. 
Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Individual 
differences between people with higher or lower degrees of individualist or 
collectivist values may influence reactions to single victims and groups in a similar 
manner; such that people with stronger personal horizontal-collectivist values (i.e. 
people with greater interdependence values) will be less affected by the singularity 
effect.   
Scope insensitivity in helping decisions 	  
 
8 	  
	  
Overview of the studies  
We examined these predictions in three studies, collecting real contributions to 
identified sick children in need of expensive medication. The first study is an 
explorative attempt to compare reactions of people from two different cultures to 
single victims and groups. One group is known for its collectivist culture and values 
and the other group is known as having a more individualistic values. The second 
study is a correlative one in which we examine the role of individual differences in 
horizontal and vertical collectivist and individualistic values in predicting 
contributions to individual victims and to groups of victims in need. Finally, in the 
third study we experimentally enhance the salience of individualistic or collectivist 
values, using a priming manipulation, after which participants had an opportunity to 
contribute either to a single victim or to a group of victims experiencing the same 
need. This manipulation allows us to examine more causal and direct relationships 
between collectivist and individualistic values and contributions to single victims and 
groups.  
Study 1 
 The first study was conducted in order to examine our main hypothesis; 
namely, that the singularity effect of identified victims found in research conducted in 
western cultures, is more dominant among people who were brought up in 
individualistic cultures and weaker among those who were brought up in a more 
collectivist society. Participants in this study were Bedouin and western Israeli 
undergraduate students, all studying at the same faculty at the Ben-Gurion University 
in south Israel and were presented with a single identified sick child or a group of sick 
children (manipulated between subjects) in need of an expensive medication.  
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According to Hofstede's individualism index (Hofstede, 1991) Israel (54) is 
just slightly above the median score in individualistic orientations. However, the 
Israeli society is a blend of individualistic and collectivist cultures; therefore this 
average reflects people on both ends of the index. Specifically, western Israelis grew 
up in a more individualistic society in small families with a focus on the parent-
children relationship rather than the extended family. On the other hand, Bedouins in 
Israel are known for their collectivist culture and lifestyle (e.g., Hofstede, 2001, p. 
243; Dwairy, 2004). Some of them still live in extended families, with many children 
and close ties to all other family members. In order to examine the differences 
between levels of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism among these 
two ethnic groups, a pilot study was conducted. 
Pilot study 
The pilot study included 64 Bedouins and 72 western Israeli students at the Ben 
Gurion University. Participants completed the horizontal-vertical individualism-
collectivism scale developed by Triandis, and Gelfand, (1998). The original scale 
contains 27 items reflecting the 4 different constructs (5 HI, 8 VI, 8 HC and 6 for the 
VC subscales). In our study we used the 16 highest loading items obtained in 
Triandis, and Gelfand, (1998) analysis; four for each of the four factors: Vertical-
collectivism (e.g. "Parents and children must stay together as much as possible"); 
Horizontal-collectivism, (e.g. "If a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud"); 
Vertical-individualism (e.g. "It is important that I do my job better than others"); and 
Horizontal-individualism (e.g. "I'd rather depend on myself than others"). To see the 
list of all 16 items, see Triandis & Gelfand, 1998, Table 2, P.120. This scale is widely 
used to examine individual differences in collectivism and individualism and was 
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validated in many cross cultural studies (e.g. Chen, 2007; Chiou, 2001). In the present 
study Cronbach's alphas for the collectivist scales were .74 and .76 for the HC, and 
the VC scales respectively; and lower for the individualistic scales .50, and .60 for the 
HI, and the VI scales respectively (note that each scale includes only 4 items). 
Results 
 We conducted 4 independent sample T-tests to examine the differences 
between the two origin-groups (western Israelis and Bedouins) in ratings of the four 
sub-scales. Results reveal significant differences between ratings of the two 
collectivist sub-scales: t(134)=2.29, p=.024,  Cohen's d =.39 and t(134)=5.3, p<.001, 
Cohen's d=.91 for the HC and VC scales respectively; such that the  Bedouins' ratings 
were higher than the western Israelis' (M=5.21 SD=.62 vs. M=4.96 SD=.64 and 
M=5.49 SD=.48 vs. M=4.89 SD=.75 in the HC and VC scales respectively). No 
significant differences were found between western Israelis' and Bedouins' ratings in 
the two individualistic scales (M=4.43 SD=.72 vs. M=4.52 SD=.83; t(134)=.67, 
p=.50, Cohen's d =.12 in the HI scale and M=3.94 SD=.93 vs. M=4.10 SD=.77; 
t(134)=1.08, p=.28. Cohen's d =.19 for the VI scales). Results of independent t-tests to 
examine the overall differences between the two origin groups in collectivists and 
individualistic values (mean of the 8 items in each scale) reveal similar results, 
suggesting that the two groups significantly differ in levels of collectivist values 
t(134)=4.63, p<.001, Cohen's d=.79 ; while no significant difference was found 
between levels of individualistic values in the two groups t(134)= 1.14, p=.25, 
Cohen's d =.20.   
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In summary, the results of the pilot study suggest that the Bedouin students 
express higher collectivist values than the western Israelis (both horizontal and 
vertical); while the two groups express similar levels of the two individualistic values. 
These results may demonstrate that although the Bedouin society in Israel (and 
especially young students) has been through a process of assimilations in the western 
Israeli individualistic culture and expresses similar degrees of individualistic values as 
western Israelis, they still hold the more collectivist values of their culture.  
Main study 1    
Participants in the main study were Bedouins and Western Israeli students from the 
same backgrounds as the participants in the pilot study. They were all presented with 
either single victims or groups of eight victims from their respective ethnicity (in-
group) in need of an expensive medication and had a real opportunity to contribute 
money to save the victim/s' lives. 
Method 
One hundred and twenty four undergraduate students at the Ben Gurion 
University (61% of whom were females1, mean age=23, SD=2.90) participated in the 
study at the end of classes or while working individually at the library. Fifty seven 
participants were western Israeli students, while sixty seven were Bedouin students. 
Participants were told that the experimental session includes several unrelated 
questionnaires, for which they would receive ten shekels. Participants first received 
the money (given in one shekel coins) and then received a short booklet of 
questionnaires, which included the questionnaire for the current study.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
1 Statistical	  analyses	  revealed	  no	  significant	  gender	  differences	  in	  any	  of	  the	  variables	  examined,	  and	  
none	  of	  the	  interactions	  between	  gender	  and	  the	  other	  variables	  were	  significant.	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Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions 
manipulating the singularity of the victim: a single identified victim vs. a group of 
eight identified victims. All participants read the same basic story adapted from Kogut 
and Ritov (2005a) describing a sick child or a group of 8 sick children, being treated 
in a medical center, whose lives are in danger. In order to increase the participants' 
identification with the victims, the victims were always introduced as members of the 
same origin (ethnic group) as the participant such that western Israelis read about sick 
western Israeli children while the Bedouin participants read about sick Bedouin 
children2. In addition, the questionnaires were given to the participants in their own 
native language such that western Israelis read the questionnaire in Hebrew and the 
Bedouin participants read the same description in Arabic3. Next, the questionnaire 
reported that: “recently a new drug was developed that cures the disease. 
Unfortunately this drug is extremely expensive, and unless a sum of 1,500,000 
Shekels (about $500,000) is raised soon, it will no longer be possible to save the lives 
of the sick children [sick child]”.  
We used two group portraits each with eight children (four boys and four girls) 
for the identification of the group; one presented Bedouin children and the other 
presented western Israeli children. In the single victim condition we used two 
individual portraits (one boy and one girl) that were cut out of each of the group 
portraits; such that participants in the single victim condition saw one of the two 
children  randomly (a boy or a girl from their respective ethnic in-group). In addition, 
the name/s of the children were given. After reading about the children's plight, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
2 	  The	  singularity	  effect	  of	  identifiable	  victims	  may	  be	  restricted	  to	  in-­‐group	  victims	  (see	  Kogut	  &	  Ritov,	  
2007)	  
3 	  The	  questionnaires	  were	  translated	  independently	  by	  two	  Bedouin	  students	  and	  were	  checked	  by	  a	  
third	  Bedouin	  student	  to	  ensure	  full	  agreement.	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participants were asked whether they were willing to contribute money to help save 
the victims’ lives. If they responded in the affirmative, they could contribute any 
amount of money they wished. In particular, they could donate any part of the ten 
shekels they had received in payment for their participation in this study, or they 
could donate a higher sum by adding as much as they wanted to. Subjects were 
instructed to put the questionnaire, together with the donation (if any) in a sealed, 
unmarked envelope. All the money raised in this study was transferred by the 
experimenter to the Hayim Association, an Israeli organization that helps children 
with cancer. 
Results and Discussion 
 Participants' contributions ranged between 0 (26 participants) to 80 shekels (1 
participant), M=7.28, SD=8.46. Contributions for the two single identified victims 
(the boy and the girl within each ethnic group) did not significantly differ; hence 
responses in the single victim condition were averaged across the two victims. Since 
the contributions did not distribute normally (skewness=5.33), and due to the use of 
an open-ended scale (with 9 contributors giving more than the 10 shekels received for 
participation), we report in all three studies the analyses of the log-transformed 
contributions. To ensure that the transformation will distinguish between contribution 
of 0 (no contribution) and contributions of small amounts (1 shekel) we first added 1 
to all contributions and then conducted the log transformation. In addition, the 
analyses on real contribution amounts are reported in footnotes and reveal similar 
results. Results of a two way ANOVA with subjects' origin (western Israelis vs. 
Bedouins) and the victims' singularity (single vs. group) as the between-subject 
factors reveal no significant main effect of subjects' origin (western Israelis vs. 
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Bedouins; F(1,120)=.07, p=.78, ηp2=.001). The main effect for singularity was 
significant F(1,120)=5.01, p=.027, ηp2=.04, such that overall single victims (M=.80, 
SD=.43) received greater contributions than groups of eight victims (M=.64, SD=.46). 
However, this effect was qualified by a significant two way interaction between the 
two independent variables F(1,120)=4.37, p=.039, ηp2=.04. As can be seen in Figure 
1, simple effect tests reveal that the single victim received significantly higher 
contributions (M=.91, SD=.38) than the group of victims (M=.56, SD=.49) only for 
western Israeli subjects (p=.004, effect size d=.80) but not for the Bedouins 
participants (Single victims M=.72, SD=.46; groups M=.71, SD=.42; p=.91, effect 
size d=.04). Looking at contributions to groups, no significant difference was found 
between donations by western Israelis and Bedouins (p=.21, effect size d=.33); while 
in the single victim condition the difference between donations by western Israelis 
and Bedouins approached significance (p=.09, effect size d=.55).  
 
----Insert Figure 1 about here---- 
Our explorative examination in study 1 gives initial support to the idea that the 
singularity effect is less dominant in collectivist cultures or among individuals with 
collectivist values as compared with people with lower collectivist values. Unlike 
typical studies that examine cultural differences by comparing different cultures (e.g. 
American and Japanese) who may differ in many other variables besides 
individualism collectivism, participants in our study were all Israelis and grew up in 
the same political and pop cultural landscape and currently attend the same university. 
This likely yields fewer additional variables confounded with collectivism versus 
individualism and strengthens the assumption that the different reactions observed in 
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the donation pattern stem from the different cultural backgrounds. However, the two 
groups may still differ in characteristics other than individualistic/collectivist values. 
In addition, the role of the collectivist scale in explaining the different donation 
patterns is yet to be examined, because in study 1 different samples of participants 
completed the collectivist scale and made the donation decision. In the next study we 
measure individual differences in horizontal and vertical individualistic and 
collectivist values and examine their role in predicting contributions to single victims 
and groups.  
Study 2 
Method 
One hundred and four undergraduate students from Ben-Gurion University 
participated in the study (66% females, mean age 24.32, SD= 1.98). To avoid possible 
confounds all participants in this study were western Israelis. The study was 
conducted in two different sessions. At the beginning of the semester participants 
completed a booklet of questionnaires at the end of an introductory class in return for 
course credit. One of the questionnaires was the 16 items horizontal-vertical, 
individualism-collectivism scale adopted from Triandis, and Gelfand, (1998) as 
described in the pilot study. In the present study Cronbach's alphas were .71, .60, .75, 
and .76 for the HI, VI, HC, and the VC scales respectively. The other questionnaires 
in the booklet belonged to another unrelated study. Three months later the participants 
completed the second part of the study for which they were paid 10 Shekels. The 
participants were not aware to the fact that the two parts were related. The method of 
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the second part of the study was the same as the one used in study 14, in which 
participants read about the one or the group of eight children in need of expensive 
medicine and had an opportunity to donate money to help the victim/s in a sealed 
envelope. 
Results and Discussion 
Participants' contributions ranged between 0 (31 participants) to 25 shekels, 
M=5.89, SD=5.46. As in the previous study, here too contributions did not distribute 
normally and the scale was open ended (7 participants contributed more than 10 
shekels), thus we report the analyses of the log-transformed contributions using the 
same method described in study 1. Overall contributions to the single identified victim 
(M-log=.77, SD=.41) exceeded contributions to the group (M-log=.51, SD=.48), 
demonstrating the singularity effect [t(102)=2.98, p=.004, Cohen's d =.59].  
We first examine the role of general collectivist and individualistic values 
(beyond the horizontal and vertical sub-scales) in predicting donations to single 
victims and groups. A simple regression analysis on log transformation of donations 
was conducted with the two sub-scales and the singularity of the victim, as well as all 
two way interactions as the predictors. The model reveals significant results 
F(5,98)=6.44, p=.001, and accounted for 24.7% of the donation variance. Both the 
role of the collectivist and the individualistic scales were significant, such that 
collectivist values were associated with overall higher donations (t = 3.66, β=.46, 
p=.001), while individualistic values were associated with overall lower donations (t = 
-2.60, β=-.34, p=.011). The interaction between the singularity of the victim and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
4 Since	  there	  was	  no	  difference	  between	  contributions	  to	  the	  boy	  and	  the	  girl	  presented	  in	  the	  single	  
victim	  condition	  in	  study	  1,	  in	  this	  study	  we	  used	  the	  boy's	  picture	  only	  in	  this	  condition.	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individualistic values was not significant (t=1.56, β=.94, p=.12). However, the 
interaction between the singularity of the victim and collectivist values was significant 
(t = 2.51, β=1.89, p=.014). Simple regression analyses on log contributions conducted 
on the single victim condition and on the group condition separately, with the 
collectivist scale as the predictor revealed significant results only in the group 
condition F(1,49)=13.36, p=.001 and contributed 21.4% of the donation variance in 
this condition. In the single victim condition no significant results were found 
F(1,51)=.036, p=.85, R²=.001. To examine the unique role of personal horizontal and 
vertical individualistic and collectivist values in predicting donations to the single 
victim and to the group, another simple regression analysis was conducted on the log 
transformation of donations, with the five main effects (the singularity of the victim, 
HI, VI, HC, VC) and the two way interactions between singularity and each of the 
sub-scales as the predictors. The model reveals significant results F(9,94)=3.98, 
p=.001, and contributed 27.6% of the donation variance. The contribution of the HC 
scale was significant suggesting an overall positive correlation between HC and 
donations (t=2.56, β=.39, p=.01). The contribution of the HI scale approached 
significance, suggesting an overall negative correlation between HI and donations (t = 
-1.90, β=-.25, p=.061). The results for VC (t=1.18, β=.17, p=.24) and VI (t=-74, β=-
.10, p=.46) were not significant. Most importantly, the interaction between the HC 
scale and the singularity of the victim significantly contributed to the model (t = 2.61, 
β=2.06, p=.01). This interaction was plotted in Figure 2 according to the 
recommendation of Aiken and West (1991), one SD above the mean of the 
collectivism scale and one SD below that mean in each condition (single victim and 
group of victims). A simple regression analysis on log contributions conducted on the 
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single victim condition and on the group condition separately, with HC scale as the 
predictor revealed significant results only in the group condition F(1,49)=15.77, 
p=.001 and contributed 24.3% of the donation variance in this condition. In the single 
victim condition no significant results were found F(1,51)=.40, p=.53, R²=.0085. The 
other interactions did not have a significant contribution to the model (t=1.65, β=.91, 
p=.10 for the interaction between singularity and HI: t=-.19, β=-.13, p=.85 for the 
interaction with VC and t=-.20, β=-.11, p=.84 for the interaction between singularity 
and VI).   
----Insert figure 2 about here---- 
As can be seen in the figure, the singularity effect is more pronounced for 
people who score lower on the horizontal-collectivist scale than for people who score 
higher on this scale. Moreover, HC enhances contributions to a group of victims and 
has no effect on contributions to single individuals.    
The results of the second study provide strong evidence for our hypothesis that 
the singularity effect is less pronounced in helping decisions made by people with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
5 	  Repeating the same regression analysis on the raw donation amounts reveals similar 
results: Specifically, the interaction between HC scale and the singularity of the victim 
approached significance, t = 1.90, β=1.58, p=.06. Here too, a simple regression analysis 
reveals significant results only in the group condition F(1,49)=14.70, p<.001, R²=.23 and not 
in the single victim condition F(1,51)=001, p=.98, R²=001. 
A regression analysis with the singularity of the victim, the collectivist scale (mean of 
the 8 collectivist items) and individualistic scales (mean of the 8 individualistic items) as well 
as the interactions between singularity and the two scales, reveals significant results 
F(5,98)=6.44, p=.001, and contributed 24.7% of the donation variance; with a significant 
interaction between the collectivist scale and the singularity of the victim (t = -2.51, p=.014). 
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higher collectivist values in general, and more specifically people with higher 
horizontal collectivist values (as compared with people with lower collectivist values). 
People with stronger overall collectivist values and HC values in particular donated 
similar amounts to single victims and groups; while people with lower collectivist 
values (and specifically lower HC values) decreased giving when the victim was a 
group. Importantly, the individualistic scales did not significantly interact with the 
type of victim (single or group), suggesting that the singularity effect is more affected 
by collectivist values rather than by individualistic values. Donations to single victims 
were not significantly affected by individualistic or collectivist values. These results 
may suggest that the spontaneous reaction toward single victims is not dependent on 
individualistic or collectivist values. As suggested by Kogut & Ritov (2005) the 
singularity effect may stem from the different cognitive mechanisms underlying our 
perceptions of single persons and groups (e.g. Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Susskind 
et al. 1999). The extensive processing of information about individuals (as compared 
with the processing of information about groups) may increase caring and helping 
single recipients for both individualistic and more collectivist individuals. On the 
other hand, collectivist values may increase interdependence and caring for groups.  
Individualism and collectivism may be conceived as opposite ends of the same 
underlying continuum. However, our findings are in line with the notion that at the 
individual level of measurement, a multidimensional view of individualism and 
collectivism is more appropriate (Leung, 1989; Triandis, 1989).  
The findings that the individualistic scale was negatively correlated with 
donations are at odds with Kemmelmeier et al. (2006) who found higher levels of 
charitable giving in individualistic states (as compared with more collectivist states) in 
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the United States. There might be several reasons for this discrepancy: First, 
Kemmelmeier's et al. research examined the state level as compared with the 
investigation of the individual level in the current study. Second, Kemmelmeier's et 
al. used a continuum scale with individualism and collectivism as opposite ends, 
while the current research treated individualism and collectivism in a 
multidimensional view using different scales for each. Finally, Kemmelmeier et al. 
suggest that individualism is positively related to charitable giving mostly for causes 
that are compatible with core individualist values. In their study the data describes 
people's natural behavior during the year. Hence participants were free to choose if, 
when and how much to donate at any moment. In the current study participants were 
asked to donate to one cause, during the time of the experiment. This type of request 
is less compatible with individualistic values according to which people are free to 
choose the targets of help and the goals that are perceived most important to them. It 
might be that confronting participants with such a direct request resulted with the 
negative correlation between individualistic values and donations.   
In the third study we examine more causal relationships between collectivist / 
individualistic values and the singularity effect by activating these values using a 
priming manipulation. 
Study 3 
  Besides the more global social values (more independent values in 
individualistic cultures as opposed to more interdependent values in collectivist 
cultures; Markus & Kitayama, 1991), immediate influences in the social situation may 
temporarily shape people’s immediate values. A number of studies have shown that 
values like individualism–collectivism may be situationally primed, so that a 
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particular set of values becomes salient to the subject (e.g., Brewer & Gardner, 1996; 
Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; Goncalo & Staw, 2006;  Oyserman, Coon & 
Kemmelmeier, 2002). Thus for example, when collectivist values were primed, 
European and North American students mentioned more group attributes and fewer 
personal attributes as compared to a condition in which individual values were primed 
(Gardner et al., 1999). In a meta-analytic review Oyserman and Lee (2008) describe 
the most common priming techniques used to study culture influences. In one of the 
most common techniques participants are asked to write about their similarities or 
their diﬀerences with friends and family (e.g., Trafimow, Triandis & Goto, 1991). 
Another common task includes participants reading a passage with either singular (I, 
me, mine) or plural ﬁrst-person (we, us, our) pronouns asking them to circle these 
pronouns (e.g., Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999). Oyserman and Lee (2008) conclude 
that activating the concepts “I” and “we” activate relevant values, ways of describing 
oneself, and engagement with others (p. 316). Such priming manipulations may help 
to examine more causal direct relationships between collectivist and individualistic 
values and behaviors.  
  In the current study we aim to demonstrate causal relationships between 
individualistic vs. collectivist values and the singularity effect by using such a priming 
manipulation and confronting participants with either a single victim or a group of 
victims experiencing the same need. Specifically, we sought to use a priming 
assignment that would activate horizontal-individualism (i.e. activate individuals' 
independent and distinctive aspects of self without desiring special status) and 
horizontal-collectivism (i.e. activating individuals' interdependent aspects of self 
without the aspect of being submitted easily to authority). Hence, we combined the 
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two common priming techniques described above by asking participants to write 
either about themselves (using the words I, me or mine) or about a significant 
reference group, such as their family or another meaningful group (using the words 
we, us, our). We did not ask participants to write about their similarities or their 
diﬀerences to friends and family since we suspected that this will also manipulate 
closeness/distance from others and may reduce overall donations in the prime 
individualistic conditions. Perceptions of similarity tend to increase relatedness to 
another person leading to greater subsequent helping behavior (e.g. Cialdini et. al. 
1997). The opposite pattern is expected when increasing perceptions of dissimilarity 
(possibly leading to less helping behavior). 
Method 
One hundred and twenty four undergraduate students from the Ben-Gurion 
University participated in the study at the end of classes or while working individually 
at the library (59% females, mean age 23.94, SD=2.14) in return for 10 shekels as 
payment. Participants were told that they would complete two unrelated short 
questionnaires that were gathered for reasons of convenience. They received the 
questionnaire in an envelope with their payment (given in one shekel coins). They 
randomly received one of the six versions of the questionnaire (priming collectivist 
values, individualistic values, or a control condition and introducing a single victim or 
a group of 8 victims) and were asked to complete the questionnaire accordingly, 
without referring to previously completed pages.  
On the first part of the questionnaire participants completed the priming 
manipulation. Participants in the prime individualism condition (IND-prime) were 
asked to write 7 sentences describing themselves. They were instructed to use at least 
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one of the words "I", "me" or "mine" in each sentence. Participants in the collectivism 
priming condition (COL-prime) were asked to write 7 sentences describing a 
significant reference group (such as their family or another meaningful group). They 
were instructed to use at least one of the words "we", "us" or "ours" in each sentence. 
Participants in the control condition did not receive this part of the questionnaire.  
The next page included a manipulation check in which participants read: 
"Most people perceive their independence and individuality as important. In addition, 
people find it important to belong to meaningful groups such as a family or a 
community. In the following question we ask you to indicate the relative weight of 
each of these two values for you personally."  Participants then rated their preference 
on a 5 point scale ranging from 1- independence and individuality (individualistic 
preference) to 5 - family and community (collectivist preference). They could also 
choose the mid-point (3) if they care for the two values equally. This manipulation 
check reflects horizontal-individualism and collectivism, referring to independent and 
distinctive values vs.  interdependent values (without a reference to special status or 
authority). Since individualistic / collectivist priming methods may have various 
different consequences (Oyserman and Lee, 2007), the manipulation check is 
especially important to examine whether our goal - to activate individualistic vs. 
collectivist values- was achieved. Specifically, the manipulation check was based on 
questions from Triandis, and Gelfand's (1998) horizontal-individualism and 
horizontal-collectivism scales used in the previous studies. For example "My personal 
identity, independent of others, is very important to me" from the HI scale and "I feel 
good when I cooperate with others" from the HC scale.   
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After completing this assignment participants read the story of the sick child 
or the eight sick children in need of expensive medicine (used in the previous study), 
and had the opportunity to contribute money to help save the victims’ lives. 
Participants could contribute any amount of money they wished. They were instructed 
to put the questionnaire, together with the donation (if any) in the envelope which 
they received at the beginning of the experiment. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check: we first examined whether participants' preferences 
toward individualistic or collectivist values differ by condition. As expected, results of 
an independent t-test on participant's responses to the manipulation check question in 
the two priming conditions reveals a significant difference between IND-prime 
condition (M= 2.83, SD=1.32) and COL-prime condition (M= 3.51, SD=1.33); 
[t(74)=2.21, p=.03; Cohen's d=.51]. The results of a one way ANOVA on participants' 
ratings by the three priming conditions approached significance F(2, 118) =2.61, 
p=.078; ηp2=.04. Post hoc comparisons reveal that only the above mentioned 
difference between COL-prime and IND-prime was significant while the control 
condition (M=3.17, SD=1.21) was in-between the two other conditions and did not 
significantly differ from either of them (p=.24, effect size d=.28 for the difference 
between the control condition and the IND-prime and p=.24, effect size d=.26 for the 
difference between the control condition and the COL=prime respectively).  
 Participants' contributions ranged between 0 (28 participants) to 25 shekels, 
M=7.89, SD=5.90. As in the previous studies, here too contributions did not distribute 
normally, and 14 of the participants donated more than the 10 shekels received for 
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participation, thus we report the analyses of the log-transformed contributions as in 
the previous studies.  
A two-way ANOVA on log donations with the two independent variables (the 
priming manipulation and the singularity of the victim) was conducted. No significant 
main effects were found. However, the interaction between the two variables was 
significant [F(2, 118) =3.06, p=.05, ηp2=.05]. As can be seen in Figure 3, simple 
effect tests reveal that the singularity effect was found under the IND-priming 
condition, where single victims (M=1.00, SD=.29) received higher donations than did 
groups (M =.70 SD=.51; p=.037; effect size d =.73) and in the control condition, 
under which single victims (M=.80, SD=.51) received higher donations than did 
groups (M =.62. SD=.50; this difference did not approach significance p=.17; effect 
size d=.35). Finally, the opposite pattern occurs under the COL-priming condition 
where groups received higher donations (M=.87, SD=.36) than did single victims 
(M=.69, SD=.46); this difference did not approach significance (p=.19, effect size 
d=.43). Results of a one way ANOVA on contributions to single victims as a function 
of the three priming conditions approached significance F(2, 60)= 2.58, p=.08; 
ηp2=.08. Post-hoc comparisons reveal a significant difference only between 
individualistic and collectivist priming (p=.03; effect size d=.80); while the control 
condition did not significantly differ from the two priming conditions (p=.14, effect 
size d=.47 for the difference between the control and the IND-priming condition; 
p=.42, effect size d=.27 for the difference between the control and the COL-priming 
condition.  A one way ANOVA on contributions to groups by the three priming 
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conditions reveals no significant results F(2, 59)= 1.58, p=.21; ηp2=.05.6 Most 
importantly, an ANOVA of log-donations with singularity and the two priming 
conditions (without the control group) reveals a highly significant interaction between 
priming and singularity [F(1, 75) =6.61, p=.012, ηp2=.081]. 
We next examine the role of participants' ratings of their preferences toward 
individualistic or collectivist values - assessed by the manipulation check question 
(hereafter INV-COL ratings) - in explaining the above interaction. A regression 
analysis on log-donations with INV-COL ratings, singularity and the interaction 
between them reveals significant results [F(3,117)=3.84, p=.012] and contribute 9% 
of donation variance. Both the role of the singularity of the victim (t = 1.96, β=.46, 
p=.053) and the interaction between singularity and INV-COL ratings (t = 1.67, 
β=.55, p=.097) approached significance. Simple regression analyses conducted 
separately on donations to single victims and to groups with INV-COL ratings as the 
predictor reveal no significant results in the single victim condition [F(1, 58) =.59, 
p=.44, r²=.01]. However, INV-COL ratings significantly predicted donations to the 
group [F(1, 59) =8.93, p=.004] and contributed 13% of donation variance in this 
condition. In addition, we conducted a moderation-mediation analysis on log-
donations (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007, model 2), with the priming condition as 
the independent variable, singularity as the moderator, and INV-COL ratings as the 
mediator. The interaction between singularity and INV-COL ratings was significant 
(t=3.13, p=.002). Moreover, results of the indirect effect on the two levels of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
6 Analysis of actual donation amounts revealed similar results with a significant interaction 
between the priming manipulation and singularity [F(2, 118) =3.06, p=.05, ηp2=.047]. 
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singularity approached significance when the target of help was a group (Z=1.85, 
p=.06); while in the single victim condition no significant results were found (Z=.33, 
p=.74). These results show that collectivist (as opposed to individualistic) values 
mediate the interaction between the priming conditions and singularity, indicating that 
collectivist values mediate the relationship between the priming manipulation and 
donations only in the group condition, and did not play a significant role when a 
single recipient was presented.  
 
----Insert Figure 3 about here---- 
 
The results of study 3 give further support to the idea that the singularity effect 
is less likely to occur for people who hold strong collectivist values (or primed to 
those values) than for people who hold more individualistic values. While participants 
under the IND-prime condition donated higher amounts to a single identified child, 
participants under the COL-priming condition showed no such preference and tended 
to donate more money to the group of sick children. Moreover, results of the 
moderation mediation analysis suggest that collectivist values (which were higher 
under the prime collectivism condition) enhance donations to groups. This 
experimental study suggests more causal relationships between the singularity effect 
and individualistic vs. collectivist values. Moreover, since the manipulation check was 
based on items from Triandis, and Gelfand's (1998) individualism and collectivism 
scales (used in the first two studies), the results of study 3 give further support to the 
idea that collectivist values moderate the singularity effect by enhancing donations to 
groups. Having said that, we note that the manipulation check scale allowed 
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participants to indicate that the two values are equally important or unimportant to 
them; however, it did not distinguish between these two possible options. Still the 
information regarding the relative preference for one of the values was provided.  
General discussion   
 The results of the three studies presented support the idea that the singularity 
effect (the preference for helping one identified victim more than a group of victims 
experiencing the same need) is more dominant in individualistic cultures or among 
people who hold individualistic values than in collectivist cultures, or among people 
with higher collectivist values. In the first study, the singularity effect was found only 
among the western Israeli students (the more individualistic group) and not for the 
Bedouin students (the more collectivist group), who showed no significant difference 
in their contributions to a single child and a group of eight sick children. The second 
study shows that although the singularity effect occurs overall for western 
participants, the effect is more pronounced with lower collectivist individuals. People 
with lower collectivist values exhibit the singularity effect by donating more money to 
one identified child than to a group of children, while people with higher collectivist 
values contributed similar amounts to single victims and to groups. Study 3 provides 
more causal, direct relationships between collectivist and individualistic values and 
donations to single victims and groups; demonstrating that when enhancing people's 
collectivist values situationally using a priming manipulation, people donate similar 
amounts of money to a group of people than to single individuals (or even tend to 
donate more to a group). The results of the moderation-mediation analysis using the 
manipulation check, which was based on items from Triandis and Gelfand's (1998) 
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scale, suggest that collectivist values play a significant role in explaining the above 
pattern.  
The differences found between the two ethnic groups in study 1 are consistent 
with the important line of research started by Markus and Kitayama (1991), 
emphasizing that growing up in individualistic versus collectivist cultures influences 
ideology and beliefs, and shape people’s values and social decisions. However, as 
suggested by other researchers (e.g. Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Oyserman, Coon, & 
Kemmelmeier, 2002), in addition to such differences between cultures, we found that 
within-cultural variations between people with higher or lower degrees of 
individualistic vs. collectivist values  influence reactions to single victims and groups 
as well. Specifically, the results of the second study suggest that when encountering a 
group of people in need, individuals with higher collectivist values are likely to 
contribute more than those who hold lower collectivist values.  
Although our results suggest that collectivist values in general are related to 
greater willingness to donate to groups of victims, our study demonstrates the 
importance of the distinction between horizontal and vertical collectivism and 
individualism (e.g. Singelis et al. 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Specifically, we 
found that horizontal collectivism, representing the extent to which individuals 
emphasize interdependence, but not their tendency to submit to authority, increases 
donations to groups.   
The question of what motivates people to help others without expectation of 
reward has been of great interest to social psychologists in the last decades. 
Specifically this research examines personal factors (e.g. the altruistic personality, 
Oliner & Oliner, 1988; personal value orientations, Van Lange et al., 2007), 
Scope insensitivity in helping decisions 	  
 
30 	  
	  
situational factors (e.g. the bystander effect, Latané and Darley 1968; incidental 
mood, Isen, 1984) and societal factors such as norms (e.g. Simon, 1990) that may 
increase or decrease pro-social behaviors. Our study contributes to this extensive line 
of research by examining the interaction between two main characteristics on helping 
behavior: the victim's singularity (a situational factor) and the helper's individualistic 
vs. collectivist values (personal and societal factors) suggesting that motivation to 
help may be dependent on the interaction between these two variables. In addition, the 
'empathy-altruism hypothesis' (e.g. Batson, 1987) posits that real altruistic motivation 
stems from empathic concern (other-oriented emotions elicited by and congruent with 
the perceived welfare of someone else; like sympathy, caring and concern for the 
other). The singularity effect suggests that empathic concern is more likely to emerge 
when a single specific target of help is available.  
The current research raises the question of whether the tendency to feel greater 
empathy toward a single recipient is cultural dependent and raises the question of 
whether we can impart feelings for groups in need. Besides the contribution to the 
social psychological literature on pro-social behavior and to cultural psychology 
(addressing the important role of individualistic and collectivist values in helping 
decisions) we offer insights and future directions to various areas of psychological 
research including behavioral economics, cognitive psychology and developmental 
psychology as we discuss in the following paragraphs. 
Behavioral economists have paid much attention to altruism and pro-social 
behaviors in the last few decades, in part due to the growing body of experimental 
evidences indicating that people are strongly motivated by other-regarding 
preferences like fairness and social norms in their resource allocation decisions (e.g. 
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Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; 2003). These findings contradict traditional models that view 
human behavior as purely self-interested. Cooperation, the provision of public goods, 
charitable-giving, and informal helping behaviors are all difficult to explain in self-
interested terms. The singularity effect contradicts rational economic thinking 
according to which one should save as many people as possible given a fixed amount 
of money. Our study suggests that one should pay careful attention to cultural aspects 
when trying to understand and predict social preferences in economic exchange 
situations pertaining individual recipients and groups. 
As mentioned earlier, the singularity effect may be explained by the different 
cognitive processes that are involved in people's perceptions of single targets and 
groups found in western societies (e.g. Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Susskind et al. 
1999). While these cognitive studies show that people perceive single individuals as a 
more psychologically coherent units than groups, it may be that collectivists' 
perceptions of groups (especially small groups, belonging to their own nationality and 
ethnicity) are more coherent, leading to greater confidence when making judgments 
and decisions about groups; which may in turn increase their helping behavior. Future 
cognitive research should examine these assumptions by comparing processing of 
information regarding single individuals and groups in collectivist vs. individualistic 
cultures. 
Our research addresses questions fundamental to understanding what 
motivates people to provide charitable aid and humanitarian assistance to human 
beings in need. Research on the development of pro-social behavior has struggled 
with the question of whether these processes are genetic (inborn) and what is the 
relative role of society, education and socialization processes in the development of 
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such behaviors (e.g. Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Knafo, & Plomin, 2006). Our findings 
are congruent with the notion that beyond genetic factors, cultural and educational 
factors play an important role in shaping people's reactions to the needs of others and 
raise the important question of whether we can impart the feelings that are needed for 
rational action, enhancing caring for groups in need. In ongoing research we are 
examining the development of the singularity effect among children suggesting that 
the tendency to provide more resources to single identifiable targets develops around 
the age of 7, when children tend to feel more obliged to behave according to social 
norms (e.g. kogut, 2012).  
The current research examined the influence of individualistic and collectivist 
values on willingness to help single victims and groups. However, the victims we 
introduced to the participants in our studies always belonged to the perceivers' ethnic 
in-group (western Israelis were introduced with western Israeli sick children; while 
the Bedouin participants saw Bedouin sick children). Recent research examining the 
role of social categorization as a constraint on the effect of victim identifiability has 
found that in some social settings identifiable single victims received more donations 
only if they were members of the perceivers' in-group (Kogut and Ritov, 2007). In 
other settings (such as when groups are in conflict), single identified victims received 
more donations only if they were not members of the perceivers' in-group (Ritov and 
Kogut, 2011). In ongoing research we are studying reactions of people from 
collectivist societies to single and group victims who belong to their in-group and 
those that may be perceived as out-group. We examine whether the reaction to the two 
targets differs when perceived as in-group or out-group. Specifically, it might be that 
collectivists' greater willingness to help groups is restricted to in-group victims. 
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Small, Lowenstein and Slovic (2006) attempted to interfere in the spontaneous 
reaction toward the identifiable victim by teaching people about the effect and 
encouraging them to think analytically about the greater value of more lives at risk. 
They showed that engaging in a deliberative mode of thought decreases contributions 
to single victims. However, no increase in contributions to groups was observed. Our 
research suggests that increasing collectivist values (specifically, interdependence 
values) may enhance caring for groups without a reduction in donations to single 
individuals. 
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Figures  
 
 
Figure 1: Mean log contributions as a function of the participant origin (western 
Israelis vs. Bedouins) and the singularity of the victim (single vs. group), Study 1; 
Error bars represent +/-1 standard error of the mean 
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Figure 2 – Log contributions to single victims and to groups as a function of 
individual differences in Horizontal collectivist values. The interaction was plotted 
according to the recommendation of Aiken and west (1991) one SD above the mean 
of the HC scale (5.01 +.64) and one SD below that mean 5.01 -.64) in each condition 
(single victim and group of victims), Error bars represent +/-1 standard error of the 
mean   
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Figure 3: Mean log contributions as a function of the priming condition and the 
singularity of the victim, Study 3; Error bars represent +/-1 standard error of the mean  
 
 
